Moved from ConsciousnessConsideredHarmful

Since there is no scientific definition of consciousness (and it's unlikely there ever will be, considering all the differing opinions and literally millennia of debate), there's no way to confirm one way or the other whether consciousness has those properties. So again, the argument at the top of the page supporting ConsciousnessConsideredHarmful seems about the only pragmatic way of dealing with it.

''What is a "scientific definition" of consciousness supposed to be? Do you know of a scientific definition of ''anything''? I know of lots of mathematical definitions but never have I heard of a scientific definition.''

''Consciousness has the properties I've mentioned above. Those are just facts, subject to experimentation and confirmation.''

That's what I mean by "scientific definition", a definition subject to experimentation and confirmation. Since definitions of consciousness are vague and rely on unobservable phenomena, they are not scientific. There's no way to confirm or deny them. If you want to say 'those are just facts' and truly mean it, you'll have to give a definition of consciousness that is based solely on observable phenomena. Frankly, I don't think it's possible at this stage in the game to come up with an adequate definition that more than just a few scientists and philosophers can agree upon. However, I'd settle for ''any'' decent definition that doesn't rely on unobservables.

Here's an example: Something is conscious if it has been observed to deceive a human in a novel situation. Novel is defined as a situation significantly different than it would normally experience in its natural environment.

Of course, that's a little vague too, and not a perfect definition by any means, but it's better than, "X is conscious if it can feel empathy." How can you be sure that something is or is not feeling empathy?

''By observing their actions?? Empathy is a complex phenomenon that affects people's behaviour.''

''According to your argument, qualia are unobservable. But that's absurd because qualia, and the relationships between qualia, are '''by definition''' the only thing any being observes! So if qualia are observable (and they are by definition) then consciousness as the sum total of qualia is also observable. Of course, one can only observe one's own consciousness but that doesn't bother me. That's because on a metaphysical level, the only thing that can possibly matter is one's own observations. And none of that "scientific observation" BS. Science is a useful social construct that must be derived from, or at least justified by, metaphysics. Not the other way around.''

''I don't have any sympathy for behaviourists because their position is stupid. If your thinking leads you to a patently stupid conclusion, like that internal mental states don't matter because they're only reportable and not "objectively" observable, then that's because you're not using the right mental tools. And maybe other people ''are'' using the right mental tools. Refusal to acknowledge that possibility is arrogant.''

You were the one who wanted to make statements of fact about consciousness. You can hardly do that if you take only your own experience as evidence. You can say whatever you like about your own experience of consciousness, but you can't credibly say anything about anyone else's experience if you rely on mumbo jumbo like qualia. You'll be hard pressed to find any credible research into qualia or any other unobservables. I say only those who are blessed by God are conscious. Prove me wrong.

[''Oh, please! Let's not drag God into this. We don't know who or what gets God's blessings.'']

No kidding.

''There's actually a '''''lot''''' of research into qualia. For example, colour vision. The requirement that things be "objectively observable" is worthless. It's sufficient that things be ''reportable'' because all you need is to communicate about aspects of qualia (eg, their spatial relations) to do science. Since science is an ad hoc social construct in the first place, it's possible to observe mental phenomena in one's own mind and ''assume'' they correspond to what other people report. That's really all that's necessary.''

''You could make an argument that it's possible to perform objective experiments about colour vision with rats, but any such experiment would be RubeGoldberg''''''ian and not how science is actually done with human beings. That's because being able to report mental states is good enough for any serious scientist. (Except behaviourists who are assholes anyways.) Besides, if you made that argument about colour vision, I'd just make the same argument about love.''

''The reason qualia are so mysterious is because not everything about them is reportable. For example, it's impossible to report what the 'red' qualia is like.''

I said ''credible'' research, and please cite some (it should use the word 'qualia' in its abstract). I'll admit I'm wrong if you do.

''Nice one. You just set me an impossible task because nobody outside philosophy circles uses the word qualia.''  [Although recently cognitive scientists have been talking to philosophers more and more, so they're increasingly likely to at least understand the word qualia even if not use it themselves. JasonGrossman]